The Metabolic Rift

Marx
Capitalism
Author

Jason Hawkins

Published

May 28, 2025

When one thinks of Karl Marx, environmentalist is unlikely to be the first word that comes to mind. Yet, sociologist John Bellamy Foster makes the case for an environmental dimension to the Marxian theory of production through what he terms a ‘metabolic rift’. Quoting Marx, Foster defines this as the “irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism” (Capital, Vol. III., 1894, p. 949). The ‘rift’ arises from the isolation of urban inhabitants from nature in a capitalist and industrial system of agricultural production. This separation between production and consumption, Marx argues, leads to a rift in the ecological system. In their excellent book “The Ecological Rift”, Foster, York, and Clark elaborte the Marxian ecological perspective in a way that is highly appealing to the spatial thinker. Spatial separation between production and consumption is not simply an argument about a lack of knowledge by urban dwellers about the source of their food. Rather, it has concrete implications for the ecological system. Consider that nutrients embodied in food products are transported away from their source, where they would provide fertilizer for the next year of crops, to the city where they are disposed at a landfill. Industrial agriculture therefore requires copious quantities of synthetic fertilizers to be transported back to these farms to replace nutrients lost from the local ecosystem.

Foster, York, and Clark go further by suggesting a ‘global economic rift’ characterized by a decoupling of the global economic system from nature and prefaced on the ability to consume resources without limit. In discussion with this argument, Johan Rockstr"om and the Potsdam Institute suggest that capitalism may be deemed an acceptable economic system only so long as it is maintained within planetary limits. However, their analysis suggests we have crossed several planetary limits and are on track to cross others. The solution proposed within the capitalist paradigm is termed as ecological modernization - a management approach based on technology and market-based solutions - advocated by Thomas Friedman, Fred Krupp of the Environmental Defense Fund, Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist William Nordhaus, and Michale Schellenberger of the Breakthrough Institute. Such advocates view ‘green markets’ as the solution to environmental ills, enhancing economic growth as the central societal objective. Natural scientists, including me, are beginning to pay attention to these trends and question the viability of such a system. I agree with Foster et al. that the pursuit by some, though not all, social scientists of fundamental laws that parallel those of the natural sciences is one way to understand the issue. Furthermore, the exercise of developing social laws often requires ahistorical treatments that fix social relations at their current conditions. As noted by Foster et al., “analysis and what is deemed acceptable/unacceptable tends to be filtered through the dominant institutions and structures of prevailing hierarchical social order” (2010, p. 20). Further, John Stuart Mills stated that “[t]he fundamental problem, therefore, of the social science, is to find the laws according to which any state of society produces the state which succeeds it and takes its place.” (A System of Logic, 1843, p. 631). An ahistorical perspective renders the preceding argument moot, as the future is assumed to be essentially like the present. The problem is most evident in positive social sciences (e.g., economics) that search most ardently for fundamental social laws of nature. The relative stability over the period of positive social science analysis (i.e., since the 19th century work of Alfred Marshall and others) leads to incorrect inferences based on the perpetuation of current social structures and relationships. As gravity has become a constant term in physical system dynamics, so economic principles are assumed axiomatic and are taken for granted in most analyses. I will return to the question of axioms in mathematics in a subsequent post.

The novelist and chemist C.P. Snow noted the disconnect between physical and social sciences in his “two cultures” dichotomy, which Foster et al. reference when noting that “social sciences [have] erect[ed] ever higher walls, constructing deeper moats, all directed at separating themselves off from the objects (if not the methods) of natural science.” At the risk of crudely paraphrasing Foster et al. at great length, which I believe to be an incredible work of academic thought, let me continue this thread. They argue that social sciences have resisted nature “essentialism”, whereby humans are reduced to biological vessels, and rather framed nature as fixed or changing too slowly to have a direct bearing on human society. It then becomes customary to view the human/societal realm as separate from the natural realm. This anthropocentric view is reinforced by the “so-called conquest of nature associated with modern science and technology, feeding a ‘human-exceptionalist paradigm’, or notion that humans are exempt from natural laws and can transcend them in almost infinite ways, given ingenuity.” Social sciences, in their most positivist and empirical forms, aim to replicate the methodology of natural sciences by defining immutable laws of social relations. This approach “has almost invariably meant dehistoricizing both nature and society - either via a unchanging status quo or structural-functionalist and teleological notion of ‘modernism’”. The modernist movement has its roots in industrialization and the transition towards scientific reasoning. For those less steeped in social theory language (myself included), structural-functionalism relates to the components of society having specific functions that maintain the stability and is prefaced on the assumption that modernity follows a rational design and evolution. Then, modernism is the teleological goal of progress towards a better state by following our current path. That is, history leads necessary to the modern state - an assumption that faces criticism for its Eurocentrism and determinism.

Returning to Snow, it would be a simplification to characterize the solution to the natural-humanities dialectic as an increased reliance on either field. As explained by Paul Shepard, Snow did not view the two cultures division as ideological, economic, or political. The issue is the framing in Western thought of ‘nature’ as either a resource or scenery, to be exploited or enjoyed for human consumption. This perspective draws on principles of ‘deep ecology’ I will expand upon in my next post.

Mainstream economics is enmeshed with the global policy agenda in ways that constrain true progress on climate mitigation. Let us take a dialetical approach by contrast the extremes of mainstream economics on target atmospheric CO2 levels with targets established by climatologists. To start, determining the CO2 for a 1.5 degree C increase in global mean temperature above preindustrial levels is hard to pinpoint. However, a good estimate is in the range of 443 ppm. Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus represent bounds on the economic view. In a progressive treatment of climate change, Stern argues the CO2 equivalent concentration in the atmosphere should be stablized at 550 ppm, or 480 ppm of CO2 and a global rise in mean temperature of 3-4 degrees C above preindustrial levels. Despite his recommendation being above that of many climatologists, Stern argues efforts to limit greenhouse gases to levels below this level should not be attepmed, given that they “are unlikely to be economically viable” and would threaten the economic system. In essence, this approach prioritizes what is economically feasible over what is ecologically necessary. William Nordhaus, a major figure in US climate policy analysis, advocates for only minor reductions in emissions in the near term, with more serious cuts postponed to the future (aligned with the position of the current Alberta government). He warns against aggressive attempts to stabilize emissions within this century. Instead, he proposes an ‘optimal path’, whereby emissions gradually rise and peak around 700 ppm of CO2 by 2175—potentially pushing global temperatures 6 degrees C above preindustrial levels. In his view, this trajectory would allow economic growth to continue, enabling investments aimed at mitigating climate risks and improving welfare.

Nordhaus even considers the more precautionary path suggested by Nicholas Stern to be too costly. Yet both of these mainstream economic approaches—though presented as environmentally conscious—still lead to atmospheric CO2 levels that many natural scientists working on models of the Earth system believe would trigger catastrophic outcomes. In short, the dominant economic logic of climate change sets targets that are out of step with ecological realities, potentially threatening the stability of human civilization and causing mass mortality and species extinction (but let us not get too heavy). According to Foster et al., this dynamic can be described as ‘the Midas Effect’: a metaphor drawn from ancient mythology where King Midas, granted a wish by the god Dionysus, chooses the ability to turn everything he touches into gold, only to realize too late that such a gift is a curse. Similarly, economics tries to convert ecological values into monetary terms, but in doing so risks destroying the very systems it seeks to manage.

Modernization theorists like Arthur Mol argue that environmental degradation is not an inevitable feature of capitalism. They remain optimistic that technological progress will ‘dematerialize’ society ('a la the environmental Kuznets curve), reducing dependence on energy and raw materials, and eventually decoupling economic growth from environmental harm. Some, like author and political advisor Charles Leadbeater, suggest that as economies evolve, they become more knowledge-based and less reliant on physical resources. Proponents of ecological modernization believe that rationality within the market system can drive sustainability. They envision an ‘ecological rationality’ emerging from within economic institutions—essentially an extension of economic logic, not a challenge to it. This outlook treats nature as a source of inputs for economic processes and views environmental problems as technical challenges to be solved through innovation and reform of the existing systems. However, this perspective neglects a deeper understanding of nature. It fails to fully account for ecological limits or the possibility of sudden, irreversible shifts in natural systems. From a dialectical and historical standpoint, recognizing ecological thresholds is crucial. Environmental change doesn’t always happen gradually; small increases in human impact can suddenly tip systems past a critical point, leading to drastic and unpredictable consequences. For example, emitting billions of tons of carbon might have limited effects initially, but as natural thresholds are approached, complexity theory postulates (based on ample evidence within individual human and ecological systems) that the resulting damage could escalate rapidly and according to a nonlinear trajectory.